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Abstract
COVID-19 generated some of the most profound economic and social impacts in living memory. 
In response to this emergency, European leaders approved an unprecedented recovery package, 
stepping up fiscal solidarity by mobilising the political capital generated by high pandemic solidarity. 
One year on, COVID-19 became familiar and vaccination plans advanced in earnest; simultaneously, 
restrictions lingered and the EU’s leadership role is interrogated amidst the first appraisals of 
vaccination acquisition programmes and the recovery package implementation. How did one year 
of COVID-19 affect trust and solidarity in the EU? This report draws on new evidence collected 
by a survey fielded in April 2021 across 13 EU countries and the UK to assess it. Bad news first. 
While trust in other people and institutions did not collapse, it is still soberingly low and declining. 
People are generally less solidaristic in 2021 than in 2020. Debt and unemployment solidarity, 
already limited and controversial, receded even more, widening the gap between an austere North-
West and a solidaristic South-East, a reminder that moral hazard concerns still bear heavily on EU 
solidarity. However, the general outlook remains quite positive: in the face of unequal hardship and 
mixed policy success, trust and solidarity remained stable, behaving more resiliently than assumed; 
support for restrictions and vaccination is still very high across all countries; support for solidarity in 
the event of exogenous shocks remains comfortably high, consonant to Europeans’ preference for 
an insurance-based, reciprocal solidarity and a protective and global model for Europe; predilection 
for solidarity to be channelled via EU instruments instead of bilateral agreements is remarkably high; 
and strong attachment to the EU persists, having even increased 4% in 2021, narrowing the room 
for unsolidaristic recalcitrance. The demonstration effect that Next Generation EU can have in the 
future of EU solidarity ultimately depends on how well beneficiaries implement the resources and 
how efficiently fears of moral hazard can be quelled by adequate communication.
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EUI-YouGov survey
The EUI-YouGov ‘Solidarity in Europe’ project, led by Anton Hemerijck and Philipp Genschel, started 
in 2018 and aims to conceptualise and analyse the evolution of European, transnational solidarity. 
Since 2018, the project is supported on a yearly survey which serves as input for datasets, media 
contributions, articles and policy briefs. Result analysis is structured around three main dimensions: 
issue (solidarity for what?), instrument (solidarity how?) and member state (solidarity for who?). The 
survey has been regularly replicated and extended to encompass more countries and questions; in 
2021, it collected information from about 22 thousand respondents over 13 EU countries and the UK. 
The 2021 wave has included new questions on trust in other people and institutions as well as support 
for lockdown restrictions and vaccination. The project produces research outputs such as datasets, 
scientific journal articles, policy briefs and media contributions, and will replicate and expand the 
survey annually in the upcoming years. Finally, it also strives to forecast trends and produce policy 
recommendations based on the data which can assist decision-makers on strengthening trust and 
solidarity across the Union.
Trust
Trust is the cement of society. Trust can be defined as the shared and established belief, among 
member of a certain community, in the reliability, veracity and ability of other people’s or institutions’ 
operations. High interpersonal trust is important to the success and venture capacity of a group 
to the extent that individuals and institutions will endeavour into more creative and risk-bearing 
solutions; when trust is exiguous, more guarantees are needed and collective risk-taking is more 
difficult. Trust is also an essential ingredient for social cohesion as a foundation to cooperation and 
peaceful collective decision-making: previous evidence shows that countries with high levels of trust 
and civic engagement demonstrate stronger political stability, voice, accountability and absence of 
violence (World Development Report 2013). It is also a critical element of social capital, economic 
development and income equality. As ‘virtually every commercial transaction has in itself an element 
of trust’ (Arrow 1972, 357), trust acts a foundation to normal economic life. By arguing that social 
cooperation is a key prerequisite for to economic development, Algan and Cahuc (2010) identify 
trust as a strong determinant for income per capita differences across countries. Education may 
play an important role by increasing trusting behaviour alongside increased political participation 
and efficacy (Education at a Glance 2015). By eliciting pro-social behaviours, trust touches upon all 
aspects of social and political life and increases the cohesiveness of the community. This impacts 
domestic governance and European integration, as well as the willingness to support solidarity flows 
across an heterogenous EU.
COVID-19 and public trust across the EU
Trust is low and declining, which is bad news for EU solidarity. Our data shows that trust in other 
people, domestic governments and the EU are generally very low across the board. In a large 
majority of countries, net trust in each of the levels of analysis is negative, i.e., more citizens distrust 
people, governments and the EU than not. Trust in one level of analysis is a good predictor of other 
levels as trust in all three dimensions is highly correlated, as well as with other attitudes such as 
left-right placement or nationalism. Additionally, cross-country variance is enormous: while wealthier 
Scandinavian and some other North-Western countries exhibit higher levels of trust, the less wealthy 
South-Eastern countries and France have very low levels of trust. In said countries, usually between 
60% to 80% of respondents on average do not trust each other and institutions. This generalised 
mistrust and high cross-country heterogeneity is bound to have an impact on the willingness of 
citizens to allocate resources to the less well-off, whether inside or outside their borders, thus 
hampering both domestic and EU solidarity.
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However, trust did not collapse with COVID-19. The pandemic has generated great pressures on 
citizens and institutions and left virtually no area of social life untouched. Governments demanded 
a lot of restrictions and abnegations from citizens, who in turn thoroughly scrutinised institutional 
performance. However, despite the full-fledged implications of the pandemic, criticism of restrictions 
and vaccination plans, our data indicates that the average variation in trust between 2020 and 
2021 was quite modest: -4% for trust in other people, -6% for trust in national governments and, 
surprisingly, a 1% increase in trust for the EU. Given the very unequal distribution of pandemic effort 
and mixed policy success (due, in no small measure, to policy innovation and experimentalism at 
a moment defined by doubt and adversity), the fact that people did not lose their nerve in the face 
of social hardship indicates that trust is more resilient than previously assumed - a claim which also 
entails it will be harder to deter its progressive erosion.
Trust in other people
Europeans tend not to trust other people. When asked whether most people can be trusted or not, 
most Europeans tend to agree with the latter. Interpersonal trust is generally very low. In 2021, 
65% of respondents across the surveyed countries declared they distrust other people. Countries 
behave very differently with regards to trust in others, with net trust ranging from 40% in Denmark 
to -65% in Italy. It appears wealthier countries with more efficient institutions tend to exhibit higher 
levels of interpersonal trust, with the exception of France which shares with other South-Eastern 
countries a place in the ‘less trusting’ end of the EU. 35% of respondents reported trusting others in 
2020, declining to 33% in 2021; erosion of trust occurred at different pace across the Union, either 
more accentuated (e.g. Romania or Germany), less accentuated (e.g. Poland or Greece) or even 
registering timid advances (Lithuania and Finland). Overall, net interpersonal trust decreased 5%, 
being now at is -29% - a suboptimal figure to many accounts.
Figure 1. Trust in other people
 
Q59: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? Possible answers: ‘Most people can be trusted’, ‘You can’t be too careful’, ‘Don’t know’. Results display net trust 
in %, i..e, the difference between those who trust and those who do not trust other people
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Figure 2. Trust in other people. Q59. Results display net trust in %
Trust in national governments
Citizens trust governments more on matters of internal security and defence than on handling 
economic and other exogenous crises. Another question raised by the survey ascertained whether 
respondents trusted their national government to make things better in a number of areas. The 
results can be appreciated in the table below. Classical state functions such as military defence 
or protection against terrorism receive generally higher levels of trust from individuals than more 
economic-oriented issues such as pensions, employment, personal finances or the national 
economy. Interestingly, trust on the ability of national governments to deal with exogenous shocks 
is heterogeneously spread: a majority of citizens trusts the national government to prevent a military 
attack, but not climate change or immigration.
Figure 3: Trust in national government, by issue
Q15: ‘How much do you trust your national government to make things better in the following areas?’ Possible answers: 
‘Trust a lot’, ‘Trust a fair amount’, ‘Do not trust very much’, ‘Do not trust at all’, ‘Don’t know enough to say’. Results display 
cross-country average net trust in %.
European University Institute
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Trust in national governments is higher than trust in others or in the EU but suffered the sharpest 
plunge in comparison to 2020. Results were averaged across the 11 areas of intervention in order 
to obtain national averages. Overall, trust in national governments is low, with an average 61% of 
respondents saying they do not trust national governments to make things better across the 14 
surveyed countries. Despite that, trust in government still supersedes trust in the EU and in other 
people, with an overall net trust of -21%. The only countries with a trusting majority are Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Finland. As with interpersonal trust, results vary greatly across countries. 
Net trust ranges from 20% in Denmark to -61% in Romania. Overall net trust receded by 6% and, 
when compared to 2020, is lower in every country except for Lithuania. This decline is the most 
significant among all three levels of analysis. Again, this is more pronounced in some countries 
than in others, with a mixed group of Greece, Romania, Germany and the Netherlands heading the 
largest contractions, whereas Lithuanians report trusting their government 12% more than last year.
Figure 4. Trust in national government, by country
Q15. Results display average net trust across 11 areas of intervention in %.
Figure 5. Trust in national government, by country
Q15. Results display average net trust across 11 areas of intervention in %.
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Trust in the European Union
A majority of Europeans does not trust the EU will improve things in all areas of intervention. Finally, 
the survey interrogated respondents regarding their trust on whether the EU would make things 
better in the same 11 areas highlighted in the previous chapter. The results can be seen blow in 
Figure 6. Importantly, the EU has an overall negative net trust in all areas of intervention. Trust that 
the EU will improve on areas related to an economic dimension – particularly pensions, employment 
and immigration - is worse than on matters dealing with defence and security. This is odd for a 
Union with no army or unified police, but may be partially explained by the difficulty in setting apart 
governmental and EU responsibilities in these matters. In conclusion, the fact that net trust is 
negative for all surveyed areas of intervention is a manifestation of an underlying problem for EU 
integration, common decision making and popular support for the establishment of an encompassing 
and resilient solidarity system within the Union.
Figure 6. Trust in the EU, by issue
Q16: ‘And how much do you trust the European Union to make things better in the following areas?’. Answers are the same 
as Q15. Results display cross-country average net trust in %.
Overall trust in the EU is relatively low but has increased in 2021. Net trust in the EU is generally 
very low, with an overall net trust of -27% across the surveyed countries. In 2021, 63% of respondents 
across the 14 surveyed countries did not trust the EU to make things better. Net trust is negative 
in all countries, meaning that in every country there are more people distrusting the EU that the 
contrary. Here, the groups are particularly more amalgamated: while the countries with more less 
net trust include Romania and Greece but also typically more trusting countries such as Sweden or 
Germany, countries reporting higher levels of trust in the EU include Denmark and the Netherlands 
but paradoxically also Poland, a relatively distrusting country in other levels of analysis (and one 
increasingly less at ease within the Union, at least in political terms). This heterodoxy defies the 
dichotomy among the North-West/South-East blocks and may open further avenues for increased 
trust in countries with generally lower levels of institutional trust. In contrast to the other two levels 
of analysis, trust in the EU has actually increased (about 1%) from 36% in 2020 to 37% in 2021. 
While Romania’s trust in the EU levels plummeted, in other South-East European countries trust has 
increased (e.g. Italy, Lithuania and Spain). North-Western countries remained stable, with very similar 
shares to those in 2020. In short, trust in the EU is broadly low and heterogenous across member-
states, i.e., defiant of a ‘block logic’. This can be good news for the prospect of improved EU trust 
rates, given that typically beneficiary countries see an increase in trust which is not accompanied by 
an erosion of trust in the countries that usually supply solidarity.
European University Institute
Solidarity and trust in times of COVID-19
12
Figure 7. Trust in the EU, by country
Q16: ‘And how much do you trust the European Union to make things better in the following areas?’. Answers are the same 
as Q15. Results display average net trust across 11 areas of intervention in %.
Figure 8. Trust in the EU, by country
Q16: ‘And how much do you trust the European Union to make things better in the following areas?’. Answers are the same 
as Q15. Results display average net trust across 11 areas of intervention in %.
Solidarity
Solidarity matters for Europeans and for Europe
Solidarity is a vital tool for resource redistribution within a polity. It allows for a more resilient and 
effective common protection against hardship, consolidates the sense of belonging around common 
goals and incentivises ambition and risk-taking. However - given the finitude of means -, the transfer 
of fiscal, technological, medical and political resources from the more fortunate to the less well-off 
requires that members within that community recognise the need to share the burden of social 
risks among each other. In other words, solidary exists as long as normative expectations of mutual 
support between groups are fulfilled.
Solidarity has an insurance dimension. Individuals strengthen the resilience of the entire community 
by pooling resources for a rainy day, but this effort is not unconditional. Firstly, intertemporal trade-offs 
are often difficult to conceive by citizens and governments and hard to rally support for, especially if 
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short-term pains are required for less tangible distant returns. Secondly, risk-pooling must fall on the 
shoulders of large and heterogenous communities, ensuring perceptions of equity and fairness in 
solidarity flows and insurance turn-taking. The suspicion of moral hazard, whereby contributions are 
unequally spread across members and pooled resources are used recklessly or abusively by some, 
is fundamentally detrimental to the purposes and sustainability of solidarity itself, and even to social 
and political cohesion at large.
Public support is an important prerequisite for solidarity. Citizen attitudes towards solidarity matter 
as voters play an important role in the outcome of intergovernmental negotiations where solidarity 
supply is agreed upon. By conditioning the electoral fate of national governments, the way ‘silent 
majorities’ across the Union perceive EU solidarity deserves an important appraisal. Hence, it is the 
purpose of this section to look into what citizens really think about European solidarity.
European solidarity in times of COVID-19
The pandemic intensified solidarity demand. Last year’s EUI-YouGov report (Cicchi et al, 2020) 
provided a comprehensive insight on how the COVID pandemic influenced solidarity within the 
EU. In the face of an abrupt exogenous shock with wide-ranging and asymmetric consequences, 
the report suggested that EU solidarity underlying common responses was in high demand, but in 
short supply. Solidarity demand increased with large-scale restrictions to basic rights and freedoms, 
overburdened health care services and the asymmetry of fiscal capacities within the EU to deal with 
the economic shock brought by months of economic activity suspension an economic halt - breaking 
a cycle of economic growth, especially in the more fragile Southern Europe.
Solidarity supply still echoed classical moral hazard concerns but avoided the mistakes of the 
2010s financial crisis. The European Council meeting of July 2020 was arguably the key event 
where supply for European solidarity was put to the test. European leaders reached a landmark 
agreement on unprecedented instruments for resilience and redistribution within the EU, chiefly 
regarding the long anticipated common debt issuance – the coronabonds – to finance the Next 
Generation EU (NGEU) stimulus package. Also, the Commission was able to efficiently coordinate 
EU-wide vaccination acquisition and rollout. Broadly, governments and the EU steered away from 
the unflinchingly individualistic responses of the past decade, particularly during the financial and 
migrant crises, when solidarity supply was definitely lower than in 2020. However, divisions among 
governments were clear and echoed the concerns citizens – and, crucially, voters – have regarding 
cross-border solidarity, particularly grant dependency, free-riding and reciprocity concerns. While 
the North-West was more eager to reduce the level and scope of solidarity, ranging from stauncher 
opposition from the ‘frugal four’ to milder recalcitrance from Germany and France, the South-East 
was generally supportive of a more solidaristic approach.
On this issue, three important conclusions can be extracted for EU solidarity in 2021:
• Attitudes towards EU solidarity throughout the year remained largely stable despite the wide-
reaching economic, social and health implications from the COVID-19 pandemic and, in 2021, 
the first evaluations of the EU stimulus package implementation.
• The nature of the crisis is still key to attitudes towards EU solidarity. While exogenous shocks 
(particularly natural disasters and epidemics) elicit a more solidaristic response by citizens, crises 
of an endogenous nature (e.g. debt and unemployment) produce lower and less unanimous 
levels of support for cross-border relief. This issue-specific solidarity gap is wider across domestic 
publics today than it was a year ago.
European University Institute
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General outlook on EU solidarity across the EU
Despite the annus horribilis of 2020, the outlook on citizen support for EU solidarity is still one of 
contained optimism. In line with conclusions from last year’s report, support for solidarity within 
the EU is real, although conditioned by several factors as will be seen below. The survey inquired 
respondents whether national governments should spend national resources only domestically or 
pool them in service of all EU member-states and peoples. This general question is crucial as it works 
as a barometer for EU solidarity across domestic publics; results are synthesised in Figures 12 and 
13. Data for the thirteen countries indicates that the net average solidarity indicated by respondents 
in 2021 remains in positive terrain: 5,56 out of 10.  Another positive reading is that countries do 
not spread greatly around the general average, indicating consonance in support for EU solidarity 
across domestic publics. Despite the unprecedented suspension of normal economic life and socio-
economic hardship, in global terms, average net support for EU solidarity remained stable across all 
thirteen countries with a negligeable decline of 0,3% in 2021 (see Figure 14). Germany, a key player 
who is greatly influential in solidarity supply, features among those where net solidarity increased 
in 2021. Much like with trust, the fact that the pandemic did not fundamentally damage or polarise 
support towards EU solidarity is sign of hope for the future. However, the old tales of the frugal and 
the solidaristic still ring true after the pandemic struck; South-East publics remain generally more 
inclined towards sharing resources with other EU countries while wealthier North-West countries are 
less solidaristic.
Figure 12. Solidarity with other member states (2021)
Q18: ‘Some people think that the member states of the European Union should mostly spend their resources on their own 
countries and the welfare of their own people. Other people think that the member states of the European Union should 
pool their resources and spend them on all countries and all people across the whole of the European Union. What about 
you – on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘Spending resources only on your own country and your own people’, and 
10 means ‘Spending resources equally on all countries and all people in the European Union’, where would you put your 
opinion?’. Results display net solidarity, from 1 to 10.
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Figure 13. Solidarity with other member states, by country
Q18. Darker colours represent stronger support for solidarity.
Figure 14. Solidarity with other member states, by country
Q18. Results display net solidarity, from 1 to 10, in 2020 and 2021
Solidarity is multidimensional and balanced by high willingness to remain within the EU. As was 
previously identified in last year’s report, attitudes towards EU solidarity in 2021 are conditional 
on several factors: solidarity is national first and EU-wide second; it is issue-specific; it decreases 
with geographical distance; and it is driven by perceptions of own gain and risk. However, once the 
decision to establish solidarity supply is taken, citizens prefer that resources are channelled via 
centralised EU-led frameworks rather than bilaterally from one country to another. Fears of moral 
hazard still haunt expansion of EU solidarity; however, when we frame them in light of the potential 
EU countries have to leave the Union - thus abandoning the common solidarity flow system -, data 
shows this extreme scenario can nonetheless be dismissed: even the most ‘frugal’ countries display 
substantial levels of attachment to EU membership. France is now the most Eurosceptic country, 
which can be concerning due to its global importance in the Union. However, the overall cross-
country average for remaining in the EU is 61%, comfortably in positive territory.
European University Institute
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Figure 15. Support for EU membership, by country
Q9: ‘If there was a referendum on membership of the European Union, how would you vote?’. Possible answers: ‘I would 
vote to remain a member of the European Union’, ‘I would vote to leave the European Union’, ‘I would not vote’, ‘Don’t 
know’. Results display shares of respondents, in %.
Figure 16. Support for EU membership
Q9. Results display shares of respondents, in %. Green colours indicate an increase in comparison to 2020, red colours 
indicate a decrease.
Specific dimensions of solidarity
Issue-specific
Solidarity is issue-specific; exogenous shocks elicit more solidaristic responses. Respondents were 
asked whether they think their country should help others in the event of a crisis. Eight types of crises 
were selected: Natural disaster, epidemic, military attack, climate change, technology backwardness, 
refugee pressures, unemployment and debt. Most respondents were more prone to agree when the 
crisis at hand had an exogenous origin, i.e., when the factual or perceived cause of the problem 
had to do with factors beyond domestic control (natural disaster, pandemic, military attack, climate 
change, etc.). This could be because exogenous shocks tend to require urgent action and escape the 
narrative of the more and less ‘deserving’ at the core of the moral hazard logic; whereas exogenous 
crises are usually not attributable to policy failure and lack a ‘human’ face, endogenous crises (debt 
and unemployment) are often connected to government mistakes, uncompetitive national economies 
and fiscal profligacy. Like last year, exogenous shocks are still the leading issues for support to EU 
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solidarity, whereas endogenous issues rank last. While net support for pandemic solidarity is positive 
in all countries, debt solidarity is only positive in Poland, Romania, Greece, Spain and Italy (see 
Figure 17). There is a large cross-border concurrence in that exogenous crises are more deserving 
of solidarity flows than endogenous crises whereas debt and unemployment crises prove to be 
much more controversial across national publics. The yearly difference in net willingness to support 
is greater in the event of unemployment (-7%), debt (-6%) and refugee (-5%) crises. An important 
conclusion may arise from these developments: the issues that least mobilised EU solidarity in 2020 
are also the same that registered highest support erosion in 2021. In other words, this aggravated 
the gap between endogenous crises for which support was already feeble, and exogenous shocks. 
In an heterogenous Union with high demand for increased redistribution and a stronger fiscal union, 
this downward trend may be problematic as abrades the grounds for solidarity supply needed to 
mitigate the consequences of future economic shocks.
Figure 17. Net support for solidarity by country & issue
Q21 to Q41. The survey ask whether respondents would be willing to help in each of the eight crises. Results display net 
willingness to support, in %.
Figure 18. Net support for solidarity by issue
Q21 to Q41. Results display net willingness to support, in %, for 2020 and 2021.
European University Institute
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Figure 19. Net support for debt solidarity by country
Q24. Results display net willingness to support, from 1 to 10, for 2020 and 2021.
Figure 20. Net support for solidarity by issue
Q21 to Q41. Boxes display cross-country variance in net willingness to support, in %, for 2020 and 2021.
National publics’ views on issue solidarity are less unanimous in 2021 that in 2020. The cross-
country variance in support for EU solidarity has increased in most issues between 2020 and 2021. 
This means there is less consensus across the surveyed publics on whether to support other 
countries. Increase in variance occurred particularly for endogenous shocks. This suggests that the 
solidarity gap is widening, with debt and unemployment crises in particular receiving not only much 
lower average support than exogenous shocks, but also less unanimous support across the Union, 
especially between the recalcitrant North-West and more solidaristic South-East countries. 
The solidarity gap in issue solidarity may complicate efforts for solidarity expansion. By framing 
unprecedented fiscal solidarity and the NGEU recovery funds in the context of COVID-19 and 
climate change and not debt or unemployment, the Commission steered away from predictable 
resistance from the frugal countries. While astute, this reveals the fragilities of long-term EU 
solidarity scope expansion, as endogenous crises still elicit fears of moral hazard and lack of 
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reciprocity. Additionally, support for pandemic solidarity has abated to some extent in 2021. This may 
endanger the political capital the EU used to consolidate its unprecedented solidarity measures. At 
any rate, and despitethese rather marginal developments, support for pandemic solidarity remains 
high and likely still capable of leveraging a reserve of goodwill for further solidarity in the EU.
Figure 21. Net support for debt & pandemic solidarity by country
Q24 and Q40. Results display net willingness to support, from 1 to 10.
In conclusion, a strong EU-wide consensus around the merits of insurance solidarity in the case 
of external shocks may provide a good popular support basis for enhanced European solidarity 
around important present and future challenges such as COVID-19, climate change and future 
epidemics. On the other hand, the aggravating situation for debt and unemployment solidarity is a 
sign that current EU recovery efforts may be a one-off, as it is still in the (electoral) interest of ‘frugal’ 
governments to oppose increased fiscal solidarity and solidarity flows within the EU.
Drivers of EU solidarity
Solidarity is conditional on net-benefit perception and threat perception. Looking into the drivers of 
support for EU solidarity, two conclusions can be extracted: first, it is connected to citizens’ perceptions 
of net-benefit from solidarity flows to their countries, although this utilitarian driver is more mitigated 
in exogenous shocks than endogenous crises. Second, public support for solidarity in a crisis is 
also associated to the extent to which citizens perceive that crisis to be a threat to their countries. 
However, this is nuanced: while in endogenous crises this relation tends to follow a self-interest logic, 
in the case of climate change we find a negative association, and regarding health crises there is no 
link at all. At any rate, overall levels of support for cross-border solidarity are generally higher in the 
South-East than in the North-West, corroborating the reading that support for cross-border solidarity 
is primarily utilitarian, whereby perceived net-losers tend to fear moral hazard while net-winners 
conjure higher solidaristic attitudes when others are in disarray.
European University Institute
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Figure 22. Net support for debt solidarity and threat perception of by country
Q24 and Q79_new: ‘Which TWO, if any, of the following do you think are the biggest threats facing your country in the com-
ing years?’. The 8 issues are the same as in Figure 17. Results plot net willingness to support other countries in the event 
of a debt crisis and perception of debt as a threat for own country, in %. The shades represent 95% confidence intervals
Figure 23. Net support for unemployment solidarity and threat perception of by country
Q31 and Q79_new. Results plot net willingness to support other countries in the event of unemployment crisis and 
perception of unemployment as a threat for own country, in %.
Figure 24. Net support for pandemic solidarity and threat perception of by country
Q40 and Q79_new. Results plot net willingness to support other countries in the event of a pandemic crisis and perception 
of a pandemic as a threat for own country, in %.
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Figure 25. Net support for climate change solidarity and threat perception of by country
Q37 and Q79_new. Results plot net willingness to support other countries in the event of climate change crisis and percep-
tion of climate change as a threat for own country, in %.
Second to national solidarity
Solidarity is national first. As undisclosed in last year’s report, solidarity is national first. While support 
for pooling resources for solidarity towards other countries is moderately high, when asked whether 
they would support spending their own taxes (in lieu of government resources in general), a majority 
of respondents across all countries support spending them only on their own country (59%), 1% 
more than in 2020. On the bright side, the solidarity divide among blocks is not present here, with 
countries in the South-East and North-West present both in the ‘selfish’ end (Romania, France, 
Hungary and Finland and Italy) and in the more solidaristic end (Greece, Denmark, Spain, Lithuania 
and Germany). Germany has the lowest percentage of citizens exclusively supporting national 
solidarity, with little over half of respondents supporting it.
Figure 26. Preference for spending own taxes
Q18a: ‘Which statement comes closer to your view…?’. Possible answers: ‘I would prefer all of my taxes to be spent on 
helping the people of my country’, ‘I would prefer some of my taxes to be spent on helping people in other countries in the 
European Union’, ‘Don’t know’. Results show share of respondents, in %.
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Figure 27. Preference for spending own taxes, by country
Q18a. Results show share of respondents, in %.
Contingent on geographical distance
Solidarity increases with geographical proximity. When asked whether citizens would prioritise 
countries more in need or neighbour countries, it was found that European publics’ support towards 
EU solidarity displays a proximity bias, i.e., it is stronger towards countries in their vicinity instead of 
countries in a more distant end of the Union, possibly for economic or cultural reasons.
Figure 28. Solidarity for whom? Solidarity and geographical proximity
Q20: ‘Imagine a country suffered some kind of major crisis, and was looking for help from others. Do you think your country 
should or should not be willing to offer financial help to each of the following countries?’. Possible answers are: ‘Should be 
willing to help’, ‘Should not be willing to help’, ‘Don’t know’ for each of 35 European and non-European countries available 
for choosing. The arrow starts in the survey country and flows to the 2 top choices.
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Preferably channelled via the EU
Europeans prefer EU responses to crises. Once solidarity flows are already established, respondents 
prefer said solidarity to be channelled through joint EU institutions rather than via bilateral agreements. 
European publics have clear preference for European solutions, with little variance around a mean of 
65% in favour of EU solutions across all issues. These figures have remained remarkably stable in 
comparison to 2020. Overall, the outlook for resource management preference is one of broad and 
unanimous support for EU solutions across issues, as seen below in Figure 29.
Figure 29. Mode of relief provision
Q21 to Q41 and Q79. For each of the 8 issues and COVID-19, a follow-up question would ask: ‘Thinking about the [type 
of crisis] in your country, which of the following best reflects how you think it should have been tackled?’. Possible answers 
were ‘My country should have concentrated on tackling the outbreak on a national level only’, ‘My country should have 
concentrated on working with other EU countries for a joint EU-led initiative’, or ‘Don’t know’. Figure represents share of 
respondents, in %.
Support for EU management of COVID-19 is contested. An exception to this is the case for 
COVID-19: the share of respondents arguing for a EU-led management of COVID-19 relief has 
decreased 9% since 2020. This may have to do with the fact that the period in which the survey was 
conducted (April 2021) was punctuated by criticism against the Commission for delays in the vaccine 
rollout programme, which may partially explain these figures with more Danes, Germans and British 
preferring tackling the coronavirus outbreak domestically instead of regionally. Despite this, tackling 
the pandemic by working with other countries within the EU framework is still more popular than 
bilateral arrangements.
Figure 30. Mode of COVID-19 relief provision, by country
Q79. Figure represents share of respondents, in %.
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Main political lessons
In an era when European and domestic politics are no longer insulated from each other but 
rather increasingly coupled, increasingly ‘party leaders in government worry about the electoral 
consequences of their European policies’ (Hooghe & Marks 2009). The extent to which voters 
condition the outcome of EU negotiations by holding their governments into account is not to 
a negligeable degree. Consequently, this survey aims to shed light into how EU publics perceive 
trust and solidarity, in an effort to undisclose the electoral pressures that may shape and constrain 
decisions on European solidarity supply. To that end, a number of lessons of interest to policy makers 
can be yielded from our data, as follows:
1. COVID-19 was not a game changer in trust and solidarity. Despite the dramatic restrictions caused 
by the pandemic, uneven social hardship and mixed policy success, trust did not collapse. Some 
previous trends were accentuated – declining trust, low support for debt and unemployment 
solidarity and the dichotomy between a solidaristic and a frugal block – but the imperviousness 
of attitudes allows for some relief regarding the immediate future of trust and solidarity in the EU.
2. The EU needs to work on building trust. The outlook on public trust on the EU is still suboptimal. 
Two in every three respondents say they do not trust the EU to make things better. Citizens 
trust national governments substantially more on making things better regarding their own 
financial situation (11% more) and their employment opportunities (14% more), among other 
issues. However, they also trust the EU more than national governments on improving things 
regarding climate change (13% more) and the global economic situation (3% more), suggesting 
the EU should capitalise on this by emphasizing its green agenda and recovery plan. Indeed, in 
a context where trust is thin, cross-border solidarity flows (as is the case of NGEU) can amass 
positive feedback effects into building trust in the EU, if correctly applied. To that end, the EU 
could greatly benefit from better communication – as well as to steer away from issues which 
are heavily politicised domestically such as COVID-19 restrictions and compulsory vaccination.
3. The current post-COVID recovery package, if well implemented, can provide an important 
demonstration effect for EU solidarity. Support for EU solidarity is contingent on distributive 
concerns (net-benefit and risk perception), i.e., follows a reciprocal rather than moral- or identity-
based incentive. Because of the exogenous origin and internationally symmetrical consequences 
of COVID-19 (making it more agreeable to some publics than e.g. a debt crisis) and its insurance-
like nature (instead of a moral or identarian obligation to help other EU countries), NGEU can 
be seen as an example of a justified instance when the EU acted as a fair ‘equaliser’ against an 
exogenous threat. Preference for EU-led solutions is still high across all issues and countries, 
opening an avenue for the EU to take a leadership role in cross-border solidarity supply. However, 
some doubts on whether this opportunity has been effectively seized can be raised; support for 
a joint EU-led management of COVID-19 management has depreciated appreciably since 2020 
and trust in the EU to make things better is lower than in governments, particularly in healthcare. 
4. The recovery package beneficiaries need to do well. Given the ‘one-off’ step-up in solidarity supply, 
the experimentalist nature of NGEU and moderate support for solidarity across the Union, one of 
the few plausible predictions for the near future of EU solidarity is that it is reliant on a successful 
implementation of pooled resources, particularly on the mitigation of endogenous imbalances. 
European publics can feel defrauded if high hopes and political promises do not deliver or if 
implementation does not quell fears of moral hazard and recklessness in fund allocation. This 
can harden electorates, thus potentially contributing to constrict further concessions for future 
EU solidarity. In conclusion, the NGEU needs to do well (both in policy and political terms), 
precisely because trust is low and solidarity supply is not unlimited.
5. Pandemic solidarity is not immune to moral hazard fears. Relying on the spontaneous surge of 
pandemic solidarity derived from COVID-19 was an astute way to bypass resistance against 
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more fiscal solidarity and a generous recovery package. Nonetheless, the decline and increased 
cross-border controversiality of debt and unemployment solidarity, the contested nature of the 
EU management of the COVID-19 pandemic and the (limited) dwindling of pandemic solidarity 
serve as a cautionary tale to the limits of this political capital; epidemics are no carte blanche 
from citizens for unfettered expansion of solidarity, and moral hazard concerns still ring true.
6. Block divides on attitudes towards EU solidarity could be breached by better communication. 
Many scholars and policy experts investigate the reasons for overall low trust in the EU. One of the 
most common suggestions is that the EU should better communicate its political successes (e.g. 
vide Perceive Project’s conclusions). Elites should stress the reciprocal and protective nature of 
EU solidarity, particularly in the less solidaristic North-West countries, where preference for turn-
taking and insurance in cross-border solidarity is higher. Additionally, and because the pandemic 
is not an unlimited supply of goodwill for solidarity expansion, the merits of fiscal solidarity should 
be better presented to more frugal domestic publics. Particularly for trade-dependent countries, 
a segmented block with increasing populism and social hardship is not in their best interest. This 
is ultimately a low-risk endeavour, as many of these less-than-average solidaristic countries (e.g. 
Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) display considerable levels of attachment to EU 
membership and the euro, thus decreasing fears of future exits from the Union. Finally, the ‘block 
logic’ does not always pan out (for instance, in trust for the EU) and the two largest countries 
in the EU – France and Germany – typically display middle-of-the-road attitudes towards EU 
solidarity, opening an avenue for communication to work as a bedrock for dynamic and changing 
pro-solidarity coalitions in future EU negotiations.
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